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Abstract: Fixed term and casual employment have become increasingly common in OECD
countries in the last decade. Research suggests that non-permanent contracts are associated with
lower job quality. This paper examines differentials in three indicators of job quality in Ireland:
hourly wage, probability of training and level of autonomy. The paper also examines four
hypotheses on job quality derived from transaction cost and insider-outsider theories which
suggest an important interaction between social class position, non-permanent employment and
job quality. Results show that fixed term and casual contracts are associated with lower earnings,
less training and lower autonomy. 
I INTRODUCTION
E
mployment statistics show that “atypical” employment, by which we mean
fixed term, casual or part-time employment, has increased substantially
over the last decade and a half in most OECD countries. In fact, in many
European countries, much of the employment growth that has been achieved
in recent years has been in the form of atypical employment. This growth has
been accompanied by increasing concern about the quality of atypical jobs,
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literature now shows that temporary workers tend to receive lower rates of
pay and are less likely to be entitled to occupational pensions and other fringe
benefits (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson, 2000; Almond and Rubery, 1998)
than permanent full-time employees. This paper examines a narrower form of
atypical employment – fixed term and casual contracts, and the impact that
this has in the Irish context. 
However, the paper also seeks to add to the literature on atypical
employment by examining the relationship between contract type and social
class. Historically, social class has been defined in a number of different ways,
but in recent years it has come to be defined primarily in terms of employment
relations and in particular, the implications of employment relations for the
determination of contract type. The higher the level of skills and discretion
required of employees, the more difficulty employers have in monitoring
performance. Given this, it is in the interests of employers to offer longer-term
relationships to professional and managerial employees with more fringe
benefits, increasing seniority and firm specific investments in human capital.
Logically, it can be argued that the same process drives the distribution of
fixed term and casual contracts by employers. Where skills, “asset specificity”
and transaction costs are high employers have an incentive to offer permanent
contracts. Where skills are lower and more readily available in the labour
market and transaction costs low, employers have a higher incentive to offer
fixed term contracts.
Our interest in the interaction of social class and contract type also stems
from the interesting consequences that may ensue from the interaction of high
skill, high transaction cost occupations with fixed term contracts. First of all,
the class theory above suggests that this combination should be relatively
infrequent. However, two important theories of the labour process, notably,
transaction cost (Williamson, 1985; Williamson 1994) and insider/outsider
theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) offer contradictory prognoses of the
results for wages of this combination. Transaction cost theories predict a wage
premium and insider/outsider theories a wage penalty. The paper also seeks to
examine whether higher skilled employees in fixed-term positions suffer
additional penalties in other dimensions of job quality, notably the availability
of training and level of autonomy. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section we examine recent
literature on fixed term and casual employment and developments in the Irish
context before turning to conceptual issues in the third section. The third
section also sets out the four hypotheses examined in the paper. In the fourth
section we outline the data used in this paper. In the fifth section we begin
analyses by examining the distribution of different contract types in Ireland.
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employment for job quality in the form of wages, training, autonomy. The
seventh section then estimates models of our measures of job quality to
examine the independent and interactive effects of social class and contract
type. In the eighth and final section we summarise the paper and draw out
some conclusions. 
II PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE QUALITY OF TEMPORARY JOBS
As Table I shows, the numbers working on fixed term contracts in Ireland
actually fell between the mid-1990s and 2004, from a high of 10 per cent in
1995 to 4.1 per cent in 2004, while over the same period, the average incidence
of fixed-term contracts across the EU increased from 12 per cent to almost 14
per cent (O’Connell and Russell, 2007). Thus, with respect to this dimension of
labour market flexibility the Irish pattern of fixed-term working differs from
the European trend. This development has to be put into context. The period
between 1993 and 2004 in Ireland was one of remarkable employment growth
with total employment increasing by 55 per cent from less than 1.2 million to
1.8 million. In this environment, employers found it difficult to recruit even
unskilled labour and this probably meant that employers were more likely to
offer permanent or open-ended employment both to ensure supply and in the
hope of retaining workers. 
Table 1: Proportion and Change in Fixed Term Contracts (Per Cent of Total
Employment) in Selected Countries
1995 2004 Change
Ireland 10.0 4.1 –5.9
Belgium 5.4 8.7 +3.3
Denmark 11.6 9.5 –2.1
Germany 10.5 12.4 +2.1
Spain 35.2 32.5 –2.7
France 12.4 12.9 +0.5
Italy 7.4 11.8 +4.4
Netherlands 11.4 14.8 +3.4
United Kingdom 7.2 6.0 –1.2
EU 15 12.0 13.6 +1.6
Source: Employment in Europe 2006, Annex 2: Key Employment Indicators.
It should, of course, be recognised that Irish employers may have less need
of fixed-term contracts than in some other European countries because of the
relative weakness of employment protection legislation for those with
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note that fixed-term contracts in Britain, another country with relatively weak
employment protection, fluctuated between 6 per cent and 7 per cent over the
past decade. As in Ireland, fixed term employment has not increased in Britain
in recent years. 
While we can measure the aggregate trends in fixed term employment,
little is known about temporary employment in Ireland, and we know little
about the quality of temporary jobs in Ireland. Two broad perspectives suggest
very different interpretations concerning the relative quality of temporary
jobs. The benign approach argues that temporary or fixed-term employment
provide a bridge to standard employment contracts. In this view temporary
jobs provide work experience and may be important as a port of entry to the
regular labour market for school-leavers (Gangl, 2003; McGinnity, Mertens,
and Gundert, 2005), as a means of reintegrating labour market outsiders into
paid work (Zijl, Van Den Berg, and Heyma, 2004), or as an alternative form of
labour force attachment for women who want discontinuous employment in
order to allow juxtaposition of childcare with labour market participation
(Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002).
The alternative, more pessimistic approach, regards temporary jobs as
inferior to standard employment, with lower pay, less job security and less
access to job-related training (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002). There is
also the concern that fixed term workers are less likely to subsequently
achieve permanent contracts, leading to long-term insecurity (Gash and
McGinnity, 2007; Giesecke and Gross, 2004).
III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIXED TERM/CASUAL
CONTRACTS AND SOCIAL CLASS
Social class has been defined in a large number of different ways (Marshall
et al., 1988) but one of the more convincing theoretical developments of recent
years has been in the work of John Goldthorpe (2000) who draws on the
transaction cost theories of Williamson (1985; 1994). Goldthorpe puts forward
a causal process based on employment contracts that could account for the
empirical observations consistently found using the Erikson/Goldthorpe class
typology in terms of employment outcomes. We want to argue here that this
insight can also account for the uneven distribution of atypical contracts
across the labour market. 
Williamson (1985; 1994) has suggested that because employers have
inherent problems in monitoring the productivity of employees whose jobs
demand high levels of judgement (which he refers to as “asset specificity”),
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and those of the employee together. Rather than offering employment
contracts with discrete exchanges of money for labour, the most extreme form
being the “piece rate”, employers will attempt to establish a more permanent
relationship with the employee by offering longer-term benefits such as
pensions, increasing seniority and profit sharing.
Goldthorpe (2000) shows how these processes produce the pattern of
employment contracts that underlie the EGP class schema. This schema aims
“…to differentiate positions within labour markets and production units …, in
terms of the employment relations that they entail” (Erikson and Goldthorpe
1992, p. 37). The schema thus differentiates first and foremost, between
employers and the self-employed since they differ fundamentally in terms of
the control and authority that they exercise. Among those who are employed,
there is a basic differentiation between two ideal-typical employment
contracts: the “service” contract and the “labour contract”. If a job has no
problems associated with monitoring the quality or quantity of the work done
and demands skills that are widely available in the general population, it is
efficient for an employer to offer that employee a contract based upon what are
termed “labour contract” principles. This means that employment can take the
form of short, discrete exchanges of money for time. On the other hand, where
monitoring would be difficult (and perhaps impossible if specialist knowledge
is required), and moreover may produce negative effects, and asset specificity
is high, it is efficient for the employer to offer a “service type” contract where
salaried payment, profit, or performance related benefits and a long-term
career structure are exchanged for a more multifaceted and diffuse effort in
the employers’ best interests. The long-term commitment and profit related
salary systems are important aspects of the governance system of the
transaction that keeps the interests of the parties aligned. 
In the context of the present paper, Goldthorpe’s theory suggests that
employers have far less incentive to offer short or fixed term contracts to those
carrying out “service” type occupations. This leads to the first of the
hypotheses that we will be examining in this paper:
HYPOTHESIS ONE: there will be an inverse relationship between social
class position and the probability of being employed on a fixed-term or
casual contract.
What happens though if employers have to offer short-term contracts to
high skill, high discretion employees? Though infrequent this is common in
areas such as IT, medicine or legal services where product development times
are short or leave of permanent employees needs to be covered. Goldthorpe’s
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position and fixed term and casual contracts. Although the service class
employment relationship is in essence defined by the desire of the employer to
nurture a more long-term relationship, this is clearly not the case where a
fixed term or casual contract is offered, unless it is some form of training
contract. Such a situation presents employers with a difficult problem. Service
class jobs are likely to require the application of specialist knowledge,
judgement and autonomy in the interests of the employer, but the temporary
nature of the relationship means that they cannot offer job stability, the
prospect of future seniority or fringe benefits as an incentive. In this situation
it seems logical for employers to use “efficiency wages” (Gintis, 1976; Salop,
1979), i.e a wage premium above the market clearing rate of similar,
permanent employees who have more fringe benefits. This points to our
second hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: class differentials in wage levels will widen for those
holding fixed term or casual contracts compared to their permanent peers.
Although wage premiums among higher social class groups may be the
outcome of combining higher skills with fixed term jobs according to
Goldthorpe’s theory, other theories predict a different outcome. Insider-
outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) would dictate that increasing
length of service would mean that labour turnover costs would increase and
monitoring costs would decrease over time making existing employees more
attractive than outsiders. The differential between insiders and outsiders
would increase more steeply the greater the difficulty of monitoring
suggesting that insider-outsider differentials would be largest for service class
relationships. Similarly, in service type contracts in managerial or supervisory
positions, employees build up firm specific human capital over time that are
expensive to replace were they to leave. These bilateral monopolies will form
internal labour markets within which existing employees are buffered from
the outside labour market. This theoretical position would seem to suggest a
third, but contradictory hypothesis to the second above:
HYPOTHESIS THREE: class differentials in wage levels will narrow for
those holding fixed term or casual contracts compared to their permanent
peers.
The two theories above apply specifically to wages, but it is not clear what
implication the interaction of class and contract type would have for other
dimensions of job quality such as the availability of training and level of
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required to carry out a job and the length of current tenure and so should be
positively correlated with class and tenure. However, where higher class and
short tenure are combined this relationship implies that there will be a
consequent reduction in autonomy, but no specific penalty applied. 
The Human Capital approach, which regards the provision of training as
an investment (see for example Becker, 1975) would expect that the
probability of training would be determined by skill level of the employee and
the length of the expected relationship, rather than the nature of the
relationship. Once again we might expect that a fixed term or casual contract
would reduce investment at similar rates across class groups preserving class
differentials. This leads us to a fourth hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: class differentials in autonomy and training will be
preserved for those with fixed term and casual contracts compared to their
permanent peers. 
At this juncture it is important to set this theoretical discussion within the
context of the Irish labour market around the turn of the 21st Century (the
data used for analysis were collected in 2003 – see the next section). In the five
years after 2000 the ILO unemployment rate in Ireland was never more than
4.4 per cent which, incidentally, was identical to the average GNP growth rate.
Fitz Gerald (2000) has shown that increasing average educational level in
Ireland meant that there was a reducing supply of unskilled labour and this
meant that recruitment and employee retention were difficult across the social
class scale. This situation may have meant that employers were far less able
to offer temporary contracts than they would have been if the labour market
was less tight and may mean that we see very little difference in the
prevalence of casual and temporary contracts across classes. This situation
may also have meant that differences between social class groups with and
without a temporary contract were minimised. If so this will evidence itself as
no significant interaction between social class and temporary and casual
contracts. It could also be asked why employers would offer temporary or
casual contracts to service class employees when their interests clearly lay in
establishing longer-term relationships with these types of employees. This is
certainly the case, but employers may often have no choice but to offer short-
term contracts if the project this employee is engaged on is of a short duration
itself or an existing service class employee is leaving for a short period that
needs to be covered (for maternity leave for example). 
We will return to these hypotheses in Section VII when we estimate
equations including interactions between social class and contract type.
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This paper draws on the data collected in the nation-wide Changing
Workplace Survey of employees in the Republic of Ireland commissioned by the
National Centre for Partnership and Performance and conducted by the ESRI
in 2003 (O’Connell et al., 2004). The survey consists of a nationally
representative sample of over 5000 employees and therefore offers a unique
and comprehensive picture of the experiences of Irish workers.
Fieldwork for the survey was carried out between June and early
September 2003 using a telephone methodology. The sample is of individuals
living in private households. Three hundred sampling points were selected at
random throughout the country and telephone numbers were randomly
generated within each area code. Respondents not working as employees were
excluded from the sample. A total of 5,198 interviews were completed. This
represented a response rate of 46.5 per cent. The data are re-weighted by
national population parameters to render them representative of the national
population of employees at work in summer 2003. 
The definition of all variables used in the analyses are given in Appendix
Table A1. The first of three dependent variables used here is net hourly wage.
This was collected as a continuous variable with categories as a backup where
respondents could not remember the exact amount. These categories were
returned to a continuous measure once again using the category mid-points.
To remove the impact of differential hours we divide the net income of the
respondent by the hours worked in the pay period. As is standard in wage
equation modelling the resulting continuous variable was logged for modelling
purposes. 
The second dependent variable used in the analysis is participation in
employer provided training or education in the last two years. This was asked
in the questionnaire as a yes/no question and is entered into the analysis as a
dummy variable. 
Our last dependent variable is the level of autonomy of the job. This was
measured using the mean of six questions on the level of influence that the
respondent had over their work to which they responded on a scale from
“almost always” to “rarely or almost never” coded as 0 to 3. The six questions
combined in this scale are shown in full in Appendix Table A1. The resulting
scale varied from zero to three. This was transformed for multivariate analysis
using a z-score. 
The other important variable from the analysis is the social class scale of
Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe known, unsurprisingly, as the EG
schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). This was constructed using the
International Classification of Occupations 1988 plus data on whether the
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is made up of eleven groupings in its most disaggregated form but we use a
five category aggregated version by excluding the self-employed categories and
combining smaller class groups for analysis as set out in Appendix Table A1. 
V SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENTIALS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT
The theoretical discussion earlier in this paper suggested that there is less
incentive for employers to offer fixed term and casual contracts to employees
on “service” type contracts than those on “labour type” contracts. If so our
expectation would be that the professional and managerial class would be the
least likely to receive fixed term and casual contracts followed by the higher
routine non-manual. Atypical contracts should be most common among
unskilled manual employees for whom monitoring costs are lowest. Table 2
shows that this is indeed the pattern that we see.
Table 2: Proportion of Fixed Term and Casual Contracts by Social Class and
Sex
Men Women All
Perm Fixed Casual Perm Fixed Casual Perm Fixed Casual
I. Prof.  and 
Managerial 
Higher 93.6 5.2 1.2 92.6 6.1 1.3 93.2 5.6 1.2
II. Prof.  and 
Managerial 
Lower 91.7 7.2 1.1 82.8 15.4 1.8 87.5 11.1 1.4
IIIa. Routine Non-
Manual Higher 87.2 11.6 1.2 82.6 15.6 1.9 83.9 14.5 1.7
IIIb. Routine Non-
Manual Lower 71.9 17.9 10.1 69.8 22.2 8.1 70.3 21.1 8.6
V. Technical/
Supervisory 93.9 5.2 0.9 98.6 0.5 1.0 94.7 4.4 0.9
VI. Skilled Manual 87.0 11.7 1.3 72.0 23.6 4.5 83.1 14.8 2.1
VIIa. Semi and 
Unskilled 
Manual 86.2 10.2 3.6 73.4 22.9 3.8 82.9 13.4 3.6
VIIb. Agricultural 75.6 17.0 7.4 57.6 36.7 5.7 72.0 21.0 7.0
N 2,108 228 76 2,219 449 109 4,327 677 185
Note: Class IV in the EG Class schema are self-employed and are not included in any
of the analyses in this paper. See Section III.
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similar rates are also found among technical employees and supervisors. Rates
are considerably higher among all other classes and we actually see very little
differentiation between manual and low skilled white-collar employees, with
routine non-manual employees just as likely to be employed on fixed or casual
contracts. As we saw earlier in the paper, the proportion with an atypical
contract tends to be higher among women across all classes, but the
differential between men and women is highest among the manual working
class groups where women have at least double the probability of having an
atypical contract.  
As suggested by hypothesis one, it is clear that non-permanent contracts
are not evenly distributed across the class scale and that professional and
managerial employees are far less likely either to be offered or accept these
types of contracts. 
So far in this paper we have been assuming that atypical contracts are
necessarily worse than permanent employment in terms of job quality. In the
next section we put this assumption to the test by examining the impact of
contract type on three dimensions of job quality: wages, probability of
receiving training and autonomy. 
VI THE IMPACT OF CONTRACT ON JOB QUALITY
Our first measure of job quality is the net hourly wage that the person
receives. 
Table 3: Distribution of Fixed Term and Casual Work and Mean Hourly
Wages by Type of Contract and Sex
Hourly Wages   Men  Women  All    
Permanent (p) 13.17 11.22  12.31 
Fixed Term (f) 10.78 9.53 10.03 
Casual (c) 7.60 7.99 7.83
Wage Differences
(p) – (f) –2.39*** –1.69*** –2.28***
(p) – (c) –5.57*** –3.23*** –4.48***
(f) – (c) –3.18** –1.54* –2.20***
Significance Key: *=P<0.05, **=P<0.01, ***=P<0.001 n.s=Not Significant.
Table 3 shows that being employed on a fixed term or casual contract has
a substantial impact on hourly earnings. For men, mean hourly earnings for
those on a fixed term contract were €2.39 an hour or 18 per cent lower than
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even more pronounced at €5.57 – 42 per cent lower than the earnings of those
on permanent contracts. For women the gap for fixed term employees
compared to permanent employees was €1.69 or 15 per cent; for casual
employees the difference was €3.23 or 29 per cent. Though women are more
likely to receive fixed term and casual contracts, from these figures at least, it
appears that their impact is proportionately less than for men, although still
very substantial.
A major issue for analysts of atypical employees has been the lower access
that these employees get to training and career development. Table 4 shows
the proportion receiving training either within their organisation or paid for
by the organisation that they worked for in the last two years.
Table 4: Proportion Receiving Training in the Last Two Years 
Men Women All
Permanent 51.3(ref) 48.5(ref) 50.0(ref)
Fixed Term 40.1** 40.4** 40.3**
Casual 21.5*** 24.9*** 23.4***
N 2,409 2,775 5,184
Significance Key: *=P<0.05, **=P<0.01, ***=P<0.001 n.s=Not Significant.
This shows that those respondents with permanent contracts are around
10 per cent more likely to have received training in the last two years than
those with fixed term contracts and over twice as likely to have done so than
those with casual contracts. These differentials are marginally larger for men
but are statistically significant for both sexes. 
The NCPP survey asked respondents about a large number of aspects of
their job including a battery of six questions which asked about different
dimensions of autonomy in their job. As described in Section III these
questions were combined into a single measure by taking the mean of
responses on a scale from zero to three. The results across sex and contract
status are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Mean and Median Level of Autonomy by Sex and Contract Type
Men Women All
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Permanent 1.53 (ref) 1.50 1.46 (ref.) 1.50 1.50 (ref.) 1.50
Fixed Term 1.16*** 1.17 1.16*** 1.17 1.16*** 1.17
Casual 1.08*** 1.00 1.27** 1.33 1.18*** 1.17
N 2411 2776 5187
Significance Key: *=P<0.05, **=P<0.01, ***=P<0.001 n.s=Not Significant.
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over their fixed term or casual peers. Unlike our analyses of wage differences
however, fixed term employees do not have an advantage over casual
employees in terms of autonomy. 
The analyses in this section show clearly that at a bivariate level, fixed-
term and casual employment in Ireland are associated with worse job quality.
It is entirely possible, however, that these associations are simply the result of
other characteristics of those receiving these contracts such as age and level of
education or the organisations which employ them such as industrial sector,
organisational size and trades union presence. This section has also made no
mention of social class, yet if our theoretical analysis earlier is correct there
should be a pronounced relationship between class location and job quality.
However, to assess the independent role of class and contract type, as well as
controlling for these other confounding factors to assess the final three
hypotheses of this paper we need to model wage levels, training and autonomy.
This is the task of the next section.
VII MODELLING THE IMPACT OF CONTRACT TYPE ON JOB QUALITY
To examine the hypotheses laid out in Section III we need to estimate a
model of our three dependent variables which estimates the impact of being
employed with a fixed term or casual contract as well as the impact of social
class. Since our two hypotheses also suggest that the impact of atypical
contracts will vary significantly by social class we also need to estimate the
parameters for the interaction of fixed term and casual employment with
social class position. However, it may well be that other factors are correlated
with class, contract type and our three dependent variables and this may
confound the effect. Age for example is likely to be positively associated with
both income and social class whilst young people may also have a higher
probability of being employed on fixed and casual contracts. However, a range
of other factors may also “explain” the relationship between contract type,
income, training and autonomy. Job tenure will be strongly related to income
even controlling for age since tenure is positively associated with seniority in
an organisation and seniority usually brings higher status and income. The
type of organisation may also be very important. Income levels and the
availability of training vary significantly across industrial sectors with sectors
such as retail, hotel and catering having lower wage rates on average than
areas such as finance and business services and so we control for this in the
model. The extent of union representation in an organisation also tends to
have an impact on wage levels, irrespective of whether the individual
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unions are represented in the organisation. Finally, the size of the
organisation may be important. Net of trades union presence, larger
organisations are more likely to have developed training systems and to have
higher salary levels and recompense. All independent predictors are described
in detail in Appendix Table A1.
The dependent variables we use are described in detail in Section IV 
and Appendix Table A1. Given the relatively small proportion of individuals
with fixed term and casual contracts we use combined models for men and
women but enter a term for being female. The right hand side of our full model
is then:
Y = αi+β1Ai + β2HE + β3T+β4PT + β5CTi + β6SCi +
β7Si+β8TUi + β9NEi + β10SC.CT
Where A: Age, HE: Highest Education, T: Tenure, PT: Part-Time, CT: Contract
Type, SC: Social Class, S: Industrial Sector, TU: Trades Union Represented,
NE: Number of Employees 
Our analytic strategy is to first estimate a preliminary model that includes
contract type, social class plus individual and organisational variables so as to
assess whether class and contract type have independent effects. As shown
above, the interaction of class and contract type is then added to this
preliminary model to examine hypotheses two, three and four. To estimate the
interaction equations we have combined the fixed term and casual contracts
into a single category of temporary employees because the number of cases
could otherwise be insufficient to support the interaction effects.  
Different estimation methods are used to model the continuous measures
of wage and autonomy rather than the dichotomous measure of experience of
training. Log(hourly wage) and Z(autonomy) are estimated using OLS
regression. The probability of training in the last two years is estimated using
a logistic function.
The full results for all the models estimated can be found in Appendix
Tables A2 to A4. Table 6 provides summary results from the main effects
equations for each of the three measures of job quality – wages, autonomy and
training – presented in the first columns of Tables A2 to A4.  
These models show that both class and contract are important to job
quality.  Employees on fixed-term contracts and casual workers earn less,
exercise less autonomy on the job, and are less likely to participate in job-
related training than those on permanent contracts, although the effect of
being a casual worker on autonomy, while negative, does not achieve
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autonomy, and are more likely to participate in training than other employees,
and particularly more so than routine non-manual and annual workers.   
Table 7 gives the summary estimates for our three dependent variables
derived from the interaction equations presented in the final columns of
Tables A2 to A4 in the Appendix.
The first panel of Table 7 gives the estimates for the equation estimating
log hourly wage and shows that among those with permanent contracts there
is a clear differentiation between the social class groups with the service class
(I+II) enjoying significantly higher hourly rates than all other groups followed
by the higher routine non-manual group (IIIa). There is also a consistent
contract effect with those with fixed term or casual contracts earning less than
those with permanent contracts. However, for those with fixed term or casual
contracts the social class differences narrow and become insignificant largely
because of the positive interaction between the class and contract variables in
the equation. This quite clearly contradicts the predictions of the transaction
cost theory set out in Section III and hypothesis two and supports the
insider/outsider predictions of hypothesis three.
The second panel of Table 7 shows the results for the model of autonomy.
This again shows that there is clear and significant differentiation by both
social class and by contract type. Unlike the wage equation, however, there is
still social class differentiation between those with fixed-term or casual
contracts, although the class differentials are reduced compared to those with
permanent contracts. These results support hypothesis four.
Lastly, we examine the third panel of Table 7 which gives the results for
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Table 6: Summary of Effects of Contract and Class on Log (Hourly Wages), Job
Autonomy and Job-Related Training
Log (Wages)  Autonomy Training
B Sig. B Sig. Odds Sig.
Contract (Ref: Permanent)
Fixed Term Contract –0.06 ** –0.21 *** 0.81 *
Casual Contract –0.16 *** –0.11 n.s 0.53 **
Class (Ref: Service Class (I+II)
Routine Non-Manual Higher IIIa –0.18 *** –0.25 *** 0.51 ***
Routine Non-Manual Lower IIIb –0.26 *** –0.58 *** 0.44 ***
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory V+VI –0.14 *** –0.67 *** 0.67 ***
Unskilled Manual VIIa + VIIb –0.28 *** –0.81 *** 0.32 ***
Controlling for: Gender, Age, Education, Tenure in job, Part-time hours, Economic
sector and Firm size 
Significance Key: *=P<0.05, **=P<0.01, ***=P<0.001 n.s=Not Significant.
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similar to those found in the second panel with class differences most
pronounced among those with permanent contracts (with probability of
training positively associated with class). Those with fixed-term contracts are
less likely to receive training, but class differentials are maintained
nonetheless. These results provide support for hypothesis four.
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Table 7: Summary of Interaction Effects Between Contract and Class on
Log (Hourly Wages), Job Autonomy and Job-Related Training
Log (wages)
PANEL 1: Permanent Fixed-Term 
and Casual
Value Sig. Value Sig.
Service Class (I+II) 2.38 Ref. 2.14 Ref.
Routine Non-Manual Higher (IIIa) 2.19 *** 2.11 n.s
Routine Non-Manual Lower (IIIb) 2.09 *** 2.08 n.s
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory (V+VI) 2.23 *** 2.21 n.s
Unskilled Manual (VIIa + VIIb) 2.08 *** 2.08 n.s
Z (Autonomy)
PANEL 2: Permanent Fixed-Term 
and Casual
Value Sig. Value Sig.
Service Class (I+II) –0.14 Ref. –0.56 Ref.
Routine Non-Manual Higher (IIIa) –0.42 *** –0.51 n.s
Routine Non-Manual Lower (IIIb) –0.77 *** –0.85 **
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory (V+VI) –0.83 *** –1.00 *
Unskilled Manual (VIIa + VIIb) –0.97 *** –1.18 ***
Odds (Training)
PANEL 3: Permanent Fixed-Term 
and Casual
Value Sig. Value Sig.
Service Class (I+II) 1.00 Ref. 1.00 Ref.
Routine Non-Manual Higher (IIIa) 0.49 *** 0.49 n.s
Routine Non-Manual Lower (IIIb) 0.46 *** 0.46 **
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory (V+VI) 0.67 *** 0.67 n.s
Unskilled Manual (VIIa + VIIb) 0.32 *** 0.32 **
Controlling for: Gender, Age, Education, Tenure in job, Part-time hours, Economic
sector and Firm size
Significance Key: * = P<0.05, ** = P<0.01, *** = P<0.001 n.s=Not Significant.
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In this paper we have sought to examine four linked hypotheses on the
relationship between social class and atypical contracts. Atypical employment
and fixed term working in particular have become increasingly common in
OECD countries in the last decade and a half. Though rates of fixed term
employment have actually halved in Ireland during the last decade, there are
still suggestions that fixed term and casual employment may be of poorer
quality.
Using data from a nationally representative survey of employees and
three different measures of quality, we found that those employed on fixed
term and casual contracts do tend to be employed in jobs which have poorer
conditions. Controlling for personal and firm characteristics, non-permanent
employees receive a significantly lower mean hourly wage. Again controlling
for a host of characteristics, those on fixed term contracts are 19 per cent and
those on casual contracts 47 per cent less likely to have received training in
the last two years compared to the permanently employed. Significant
differentials in level of autonomy also emerged. 
Together these results underline the lower job quality associated with
fixed term and casual employment in particular, even controlling for the
characteristics of the individuals themselves and the organisations in which
they work. This is important as there tend to be selection effects which draw
more disadvantaged individuals into these positions and this can make it
difficult to draw any conclusions about the objective qualities of atypical
contracts themselves. The implications of these findings depend largely on the
extent of mobility out of these positions – that is, are fixed term and casual
employment a stepping stone to better employment or a trap? The answer to
this question seems to depend on the stage of life at which individuals
encounter fixed term positions. Research on those making the transition from
education tends to show that fixed term employment acts as a stepping stone
into work (Gangl, 2003; McGinnity, Mertens, and Gundert, 2005), whereas
fixed term employment later in life can mean a lower probability of moving
into a permanent, higher quality job (Gash and McGinnity, 2007; Giesecke and
Gross, 2004).
Of course it may be that fixed and casual employment has a differential
impact along other dimensions. The paper sought to examine the interaction
between non-permanent employment and social class. Bivariate analyses of
this relationship showed that those outside of the professional and managerial
class were far more likely to be employed on fixed-term and casual contracts
and thus to be employed under significantly worse conditions. 
The paper also sought to examine two specific hypotheses about the
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transaction cost economics of Oliver Williamson (1985, 1994) has shown that
service class workers gain and retain greater stability and recompense
because of the difficulties employers have in monitoring their productivity.
Where employers do not offer such stability, as with fixed term contracts, we
would expect that this would attract a wage premium. Under this hypothesis,
those in fixed term contracts for service class employees should attract higher
earnings than their class peers with permanent contracts. 
However, a very different prediction arises from insider-outsider theory as
conceptualised by (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Insider-outsider theory holds
that labour turnover costs mean that “insiders” in an organisation are able to
derive higher pay rates than “outsiders” and entrants and, moreover, that this
insider premium becomes larger the more senior the position, both in terms of
job duration and occupational position. The implication is clear – insider-
outsider theory would suggest that service class employees on fixed term or
casual contracts will attract a higher wage penalty than fixed term employees
in other classes.
Results showed quite conclusively that the insider-outsider model gained
more support, with the service class group suffering a pronounced penalty in
terms of wage rates when employed by fixed term contract relative to the other
social classes. Class differentials were largely preserved, however, for the
probability of training and level of autonomy. 
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Variable Definition
Log Hourly Wages Net hourly wage in Euro, logged 
Received education or 
training over the last 
2 years =1 if yes, 0=otherwise
Level of Autonomy Mean of outcomes almost always=3, often=2,
sometimes=1, rarely or never=0 from questions:
● “You decide how much work you do or how fast you
work during the day”.
● “Your manager decides the specific tasks you will do
from day to day”.
● “You decide when you can take a break during the
working day”.
● “Your manager monitors your work performance”.
● “You have to get you manager’s OK before you try to
change anything with the way you do your work”.
● “You can decide to take on new work or new contracts or
initiate new projects”. 
Age 25-39 years =1 if aged 25-39 years, =0 otherwise
Age 40-54 years =1 if aged 40-54 years, =0 otherwise
Age 55+ years =1 if aged 55+ years, =0 otherwise
(Base Category = aged 16-24 years)
Female =1 if female, =0 otherwise (Base Category = male)
Lower Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is lower
secondary (i.e., Intermediate/Junior Certificate), =0
otherwise
Upper Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is upper
secondary (i.e., Leaving Certificate), =0 otherwise.
Third Level =1 if highest level of education completed is third level
(i.e., diploma, primary degree or higher degree), =0
otherwise.
(Base Category = highest level of education completed is
primary level.)
Tenure <1 Year =1 if tenure in present job<1 year, =0 otherwise
Tenure <5 Years =1 if tenure in present job >1 and <5 years, =0 otherwise.
(Base Category = Tenure 5+ years.)
Part-Time =1 if weekly hours worked 1 to 29 hours, =0 otherwise.
(Base Category = weekly hours 30+.)
Fixed Term Contract =1 if employed on temporary contract, =0 otherwise.
Casual Contract =1 if employed on a casual contract, =0 otherwise.
(Base category=employed on permanent contract.)
Social Class IIIa =1 if Erikson/Goldthorpe class IIIa, =0 otherwise.
Social Class IIIb =1 if Erikson/Goldthorpe class IIIb, =0 otherwise.
Social Class V or VI =1 if Erikson/Goldthorpe class V or VI, =0 otherwise.
Social Class VIIa or VIIb =1 if Erikson/Goldthorpe class VIIa or VIIb, =0 otherwise.
(Base category=Erikson/Goldthorpe class I or II.) 
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Variable Definition
Construction Sector =1 if employed in construction sector , =0 otherwise.
Retail Sector =1 if employed in retail sector , =0 otherwise.
Hotel and Catering =1 if employed in hotel and catering sector , =0 otherwise.
Transport =1 if employed in transport sector , =0 otherwise.
Finance and Bus. Services =1 if employed in finance and business sector , =0
otherwise.
Public Administration =1 if employed in public administration, =0 otherwise.
Education =1 if employed in education sector , =0 otherwise.
Health Care =1 if employed in healthcare, =0 otherwise.
Other Services =1 if employed in other services , =0 otherwise.
(Base category=manufacturing sector and primary
extraction.)
Employer recognises TU =1 if employer recognises a trade union in workplace, =0
otherwise.
5 to 20 Employees =1 if workplace has 5 to 20 employees, =0 otherwise.
21-100 Employees =1 if workplace has 21 to 100 employees, =0 otherwise.
101-500 Employees =1 if workplace has 101 to 500 employees, =0 otherwise.
500+ Employees =1 if workplace has 500+ employees, =0 otherwise.
(Base category=1 to 4 employees.)
100 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
01 Layte article  16/10/2008  12:33  Page 100Appendix Table A2: OLS Regression of (Log) Hourly Earnings by Sex
Model 1 Model 2
B Sig. B Sig.
Female –0.17 *** –0.16 ***
Age 25 to 39 years 0.17 *** 0.17 ***
Age 40 to 54 years 0.20 *** 0.20 ***
Age 55+ years 0.19 *** 0.20 ***
Lower 2nd Education 0.12 *** 0.12 ***
Higher 2nd Education 0.19 *** 0.19 ***
Third Level Education 0.31 *** 0.31 ***
Tenure <1 Year –0.11 *** –0.11 ***
Tenure <5 Years –0.07 *** –0.07 ***
Part-Time 0.17 *** 0.16 ***
Fixed Term Contract –0.06 **
Casual Contract –0.16 ***
Fixed-term or Casual Contract –0.24 ***
Routine Non-Manual Higher IIIa –0.18 *** –0.19 ***
Routine Non-Manual Lower IIIb –0.26 *** –0.29 ***
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory V+VI –0.14 *** –0.15 ***
Unskilled Manual VIIa + VIIb –0.28 *** –0.30 ***
Construction Sector 0.12 *** 0.11 ***
Retail Sector –0.06 ** –0.06 **
Hotel and Catering –0.09 ** –0.09 ***
Transport 0.06 * 0.06 *
Finance and Bus. Services 0.09 *** 0.09 ***
Public Administration 0.03 n.s 0.03 n.s
Education 0.11 *** 0.13 ***
Health Care –0.03 n.s –0.02 n.s
Other Services –0.10 *** –0.10 ***
Employer Recognises TU. –0.10 *** –0.10 ***
5 to 20 Employees 0.02 n.s 0.02 n.s
21-100 Employees 0.08 *** 0.09 ***
101-500 Employees 0.07 *** 0.07 ***
500+ Employees 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
Social Class IIIa*Fixed or Casual 0.16 **
Social Class IIIb*Fixed or Casual 0.23 ***
Social Class IIIa V+VI*Fixed or Casual 0.22 ***
Social Class VIIa + VIIb*Fixed or Casual 0.24 ***
Constant 2.37 *** 2.38 ***
N 4,708 4,708
Adj. R2 0.3739 0.3778
Reference Categories are: age 17 to 24 years, primary education alone, tenure in job of
5+ years, full-time, permanent contract, professional or managerial class, manu-
facturing industrial sector, non-recognition of trades union, less than 4 employees.
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Model 1 Model 2
B Sig. B Sig.
Female –0.17 *** –0.17 ***
Age 25 to 39 years 0.32 *** 0.33 ***
Age 40 to 54 years 0.52 *** 0.52 ***
Age 55+ years 0.66 *** 0.66 ***
Lower 2nd Education –0.04 n.s –0.04 n.s
Higher 2nd Education 0.06 n.s 0.06 n.s
Third Level Education 0.18 ** 0.19 ***
Tenure <1 Year –0.18 *** –0.18 ***
Tenure <5 Years –0.11 *** –0.11 **
Part-Time –0.04 n.s –0.04 n.s
Fixed Term Contract –0.21 ***
Casual Contract –0.11 n.s
Fixed-term or Casual Contract –0.41 ***
Routine Non Manual Higher IIIa –0.25 *** –0.28 ***
Routine Non Manual Lower IIIb –0.58 *** –0.63 ***
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory V+VI –0.67 *** –0.69 ***
Unskilled Manual VIIa + VIIb –0.81 *** –0.83 ***
Construction Sector 0.05 n.s 0.04 n.s
Retail Sector 0.19 *** 0.19 ***
Hotel and Catering 0.19 ** 0.20 **
Transport 0.10 n.s 0.10 n.s
Finance and Bus. Services 0.15 ** 0.15 **
Public Administration –0.07 n.s –0.07 n.s
Education 0.08 n.s 0.10 n.s
Health Care 0.02 n.s 0.03 n.s
Other Services 0.37 *** 0.36 ***
Employer Recognises TU. 0.17 *** 0.17 ***
5 to 20 Employees 0.02 n.s 0.02 n.s
21-100 Employees 0.11 ** 0.12 **
101-500 Employees 0.01 n.s 0.01 n.s
500+ Employees –0.14 *** –0.15 ***
Social Class IIIa*Fixed or Casual 0.33 *
Social Class IIIb*Fixed or Casual 0.34 **
Social Class IIIa V+VI*Fixed or Casual 0.25 n.s
Social Class VIIa + VIIb*Fixed or Casual 0.20 *
Constant –0.16 n.s –0.14 n.s
N 5,022 5,022
Adj. R2 0.2383 0.2397
Reference Categories are: age 17 to 24 years, primary education alone, tenure in job of
5+ years, full-time, permanent contract, professional or managerial class, manu-
facturing industrial sector, non-recognition of trades union, less than 4 employees.
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Training in the Last Two Years
Model 1 Model 2
B Sig. B Sig.
Female 0.92 n.s 0.92 n.s
Age 25 to 39 years 0.76 ** 0.76 **
Age 40 to 54 years 0.60 *** 0.60 ***
Age 55+ years 0.41 *** 0.42 ***
Lower 2nd Education 1.01 n.s 1.01 n.s
Higher 2nd Education 1.30 * 1.31 *
Third Level Education 1.44 ** 1.45 **
Tenure <1 Year 0.76 * 0.76 **
Tenure <5 Years 1.27 ** 1.27 **
Part-Time 0.98 n.s 0.97 n.s
Fixed Term Contract 0.81 *
Casual Contract 0.53 **
Fixed-term or Casual Contract 0.70 n.s
Routine Non Manual Higher IIIa 0.51 *** 0.49 ***
Routine Non Manual Lower IIIb 0.44 *** 0.46 ***
Skilled/Tech/Supervisory V+VI 0.67 *** 0.67 ***
Unskilled Manual VIIa + VIIb 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
Construction Sector 1.21 n.s 1.21 n.s
Retail Sector 0.91 n.s 0.91 n.s
Hotel and Catering 0.83 n.s 0.82 n.s
Transport 1.43 * 1.44 *
Finance and Bus. Services 1.16 n.s 1.16 n.s
Public Administration 1.46 * 1.45 *
Education 0.79 n.s 0.80 n.s
Health Care 1.33 * 1.35 *
Other Services 1.00 n.s 0.98 n.s
Employer Recognises TU. 0.65 *** 0.64 ***
5 to 20 Employees 0.68 ** 0.68 **
21-100 Employees 1.17 n.s 1.18 n.s
101-500 Employees 1.39 ** 1.40 **
500+ Employees 1.67 *** 1.67 ***
Social Class IIIa*Fixed or Casual 1.45 n.s
Social Class IIIb*Fixed or Casual 0.93 n.s
Social Class IIIa V+VI*Fixed or Casual 0.98 n.s
Social Class VIIa + VIIb*Fixed or Casual 1.21 n.s
N 5,019 5,019
Pseudo R2 0.0957 0.0957
Zero Slopes Log-Likelihood –3588.7 –3588.7
Final Log-Likelihood –3142.0 –3142.3
Reference Categories are: age 17 to 24 years, primary education alone, tenure in job of
5+ years, full-time, permanent contract, professional or managerial class, manu-
facturing industrial sector, non-recognition of trades union, less than 4 employees.
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